Situation Review
The global situation is extremely volatile, and for this reason, it is important to take note of the time at these words are being written. I have started writing this on Thursday March 12 (4:30pm GMT). At this time, let us establish what appear to me to be incontrovertible facts:
- The war in Iran or over Iran is ongoing, nobody has conclusively “won.”
- As we approach Day 13 of the war, it does not appear likely that the war will stop. In other words, this is different from the 12-day war of June 2025 when the US and, in particular, Israel sued for a ceasefire. To put it another way, the smart money is betting on a longer war if for no other reason than Iranian resilience and determination to put everything they have into this, and because the US administration under Trump has proven itself unconscionably duplicitous in negotiations, totally untrustworthy and irrationally fanatical over Iran for the past forty years or so.
- Over the past 24 hours, among the targets hit by Iran include: multiple commercial vessels were in the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz; two oil tankers near the port of Umm Qasr, Iraq, causing a fire; a hit on the US-owned crude oil tanker, Safesea Vishnu, by an explosive-laden unmanned boat near Basra, resulting in one death; a hit on a container ship by an unknown projectile off the coast of Dubai, causing a fire; a drone attack on Saudi Arabia’s Ras Tanura oil refinery, with debris causing a fire, prompting a temporary shutdown; drone strikes on the Shaybah oil field in Saudi Arabia; drone attacks on Dubai International Airport; drone attack on a residential building in Kuwait, injuring two people, and another drone causing damage at Kuwait International Airport; an Iranian drone intercepted targeting the diplomatic quarter in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; targeting of US-owned vessels; Iranian declaration of attacks on banks and financial institutions in the region. Coalition attacks on Iran over the past 24 hours include: Israeli Air Force (IAF) airstrikes in the capital, hitting the IRGC’s Sayyid al-Shuhada base in Tehran Province; a strike on a nuclear facility in Iran, specifically targeting the Taleghan 2 site; strole pm the Jey industrial site in Esfahan Province, which is linked to optical and drone production; strikes on ballistic missile manufacturing sites to degrade Iran’s long-range strike capabilities; Israeli strikes on the Bandar Sirik port city, an Ahvaz district connected to the 92nd Armored Division and air defense installations on Qeshm Island; internal security sites in northwestern Iran, including Marivan City in the Kurdistan Province, to disrupt regime control in protest-prone areas. An airstrike early Thursday in the Akashat area of western Iraq hit a base belonging to the Ansar Allah al-Awfiya (19th Brigade) of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), an Iran-aligned militia. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) reported the destruction of 16 Iranian minelayers near the Strait of Hormuz to counter Iranian efforts to block maritime traffic.
- For the US-Israeli coalition (with assistance from Europe, but with declining enthusiasm from the Gulf States which are being greatly impacted by the war), this is primarily – but not solely – a military war that targets military, civilian and infrastructural assets. These targets are in Iran, primarily, but also in Lebanon, Iraq and possibly in Yemen, although so far the Houthis appear to be holding back. The Houthis have not yet launched new, direct attacks on Israel or U.S. interests in response to the latest escalation against Iran. Unlike in the Gaza war, where they launched high-profile attacks, the Houthis are currently exercising caution to avoid direct U.S. or Israeli strikes on their forces, especially after suffering heavy losses in previous engagements. While they are a key part of Iran’s “axis of resistance” and have previously launched missiles at Israel and attacked shipping in the Red Sea, their current involvement remains limited to rhetoric. The Houthis may still join the conflict later, as their restraint may be a “phased escalation” rather than a permanent withdrawal from the fight.
- For the US-Israeli coalition (with assistance from Europe, but with declining enthusiasm from the Gulf States which are being greatly impacted by the war), this is primarily – but not solely – a military war that targets military, civilian and infrastructural assets. These targets are in Iran, primarily, but also in Lebanon, Iraq and possibly in Yemen, although so far the Houthis appear to be holding back. The Houthis have not yet launched new, direct attacks on Israel or U.S. interests in response to the latest escalation against Iran. Unlike in the Gaza war, where they launched high-profile attacks, the Houthis are currently exercising caution to avoid direct U.S. or Israeli strikes on their forces, especially after suffering heavy losses in previous engagements. While they are a key part of Iran’s “axis of resitance” and have previously launched missiles at Israel and attacked shipping in the Red Sea, their current involvement remains limited to rhetoric. The Houthis may still join the conflict later, as their restraint may be a “phased escalation” rather than a permanent withdrawal from the fight.
- For the coalition, this has been an air war fought with missiles primarily and also and perhaps increasingly with guided gravity bombs; because few such wars are satisfactorily completed with air power alone, there is a strong possibility of a ground war, possibly involving US troops landing in the South East or in some way making their way towards Bander Abbas on the Gulf of Hormuz, or otherwise involving a US-instigated and equipped invasion of a relatively small number of Iraqi Kurds, or a larger force within the Iranian Azeri community backed with a force from Azerbaijan. Neither of these two non-US forces seems highly likely for now – Iraqi Kurds are divided, and Iranian Kurds do not seem enthusiastic about an incursion from Iraqi Kurdistan. The Azeris have limited resources and must be conscious of the threat to them of Russian forces building on the border between Russia and Azerbaijan. The possibility of a UAE attack across the Gulf on the zone around Bander Abbas seems less likely in view of the scale of UAE vulnerability to Iranian missiles, especially on landing craft.
- For Iran, this is a military war, certainly, but it is mainly an economic war that is designed to increase the global prices of oil and gas by closing the Strait of Hormuz and striking at oil production infrastructure in the region. Volatility of prices has been contained over the past day or so by Trump’s (pardon me but I must insert “idiotic” here) claims that the war is won, but not won “enough,” and by releases or planned releases of oil to international markets from the reserves of individual countries (e.g. Japan), the G7, and by the International Energy Agency (IEA). Prices at this moment are still higher than they were and after a lull on March 10-11, the price for Brent Crude is now approaching $100 a barrel. The Strait of Hormuz remains closed to all but Iranian vessels or vessels carrying Chinese oil. One report claims that more oil is going to China from the gulf than was the case before the war started. Several tankers have been set ablaze. The Hormuz isn’t everything, because there exists an alternative array of longer and more expensive routes and there are a couple of pipelines (one of them Saudi) that can also feed oil out of the region although not nearly to the same volume as before. But stoppages to the production and storage of oil and gas are even more critical. While traffic through the Hormuz could recover very quickly if a ceasefire was to be called, it will take several weeks to ramp up production.
- As the foregoing implies, therefore, there are critical fragilities that both sides must face. Besides oil and gas concerns, the region now faces serious water vulnerabilities. The Saudi capital of Riyadh is heavily dependent on desalinated water and so are most of the Gulf nations and all regional parties depend to some extent on desalinated water. There has been at least one hit on an Israeli and one hit on an Iranian desalination plant, but if the degradation of desalinations security escalates then the humanitarian consequences of the war will become even more catastrophic than they already are.
- Predictions, much touted in alternative media, that the coalition will soon run out of weapons are proving premature. (Even in the Ukraine conflict, where one might have predicted a near collapse of the Kiev regime, given the circumstances, we have been surprised yesterday by the firing of seven Storm Shadow type missiles – likely supplied and fired, with US approval, by the UK – on an arms factory in Bryansk). Nonetheless, Trump’s overture to Putin earlier this week in which he appears to have dangled the carrot of sanctions relief on Russian oil in return for Russian mediation between the US and Iran may be interpreted as signaling growing anxiety in the White House as to whether the war can have a positive outcome for the US.
- Beyond intelligence, the dimensions and efficacy of Russian and Chinese aid to Iran remain very unclear. Russia benefits considerably from this conflict in terms of the prices that Russian oil and gas now command, and this will help Russia finance its war with the West and with Ukraine following the West’s instigation of an anti-Russian coup d’etat in Kiev in 2014, its subsequent murderous campaign against the then independent pro-Russian republics of the Donbass, and many other provocations. However, while the current situation greatly favors Russia it also invites fresh Western aggression against Russian energy assets at sea, in the Baltic, in the Black Sea and elsewhere. While it should be expected that the effectiveness of Ukrainian resistance to Russian forces will decline, it is currently spiking, as evidenced by an increasing number of successful Ukrainian drone hits on targets in southern Russia. Russia is responding by moving deeper into the Sumy region, threatening the city of Sumy itself, and moving closer to Kiev.
War of the Interceptors
A former marine major, an interlocutor on a recent TWT panel to which I contributed earlier on in the present conflict in the Gulf, struck me as unusually and a little over-insistent that the US was never ever going to run out of missiles or anything else. I held back from countering this because I was not sure whether he had access to recent, privileged information and he had made it sound as though he did.
His confidence seemed highly unlikely to be well founded on the face of it, given (1) how extraordinarily expensive anything ever made by the US defense industry always is by comparison with the weapons production facilities of its enemies (which is why Russia and China enjoy very important cost advantages); (2) by the experience earlier on in the war in Ukraine of dire shortages within the political West of the essential 155mm shells and, later, of Patriot launchers and interceptors, but also (3) because of the increasing evidence from the Gulf that countries there are running low on Patriot and other interceptors. This is due, not least – surprise, surprise – to the fact that so many of these have been sent to, abused and exhausted in Ukraine.
Ukraine’s President Zelenskiy is now complaining that the US never loved Ukraine as much as it now appears to love the Gulf countries. Not one to lose any PR opportunity, Zelenskiy nevertheless has offered to send drone experts to the Gulf to help them respond to Iranian drones.
The stinging power of US missile attacks on Iran, while enormous, destructive and, as when civilians are the target, Gaza-like cruel, is also limited – as we are learning from a recent conversation between Dan Davis and MIT rocket expert Ted Postol. Postol noticed for the first time as he watched footage that Davis showed him of an Iranian missile being launched from the desert that the launch site was covered by a layer of dirt so that prior to launch it had been entirely invisible from the air. This immediately rubbished claims from the US that it had taken out half of Iranian missile launchers. The US claim cannot be true because the US surely does not know how many launchers there are in the first place nor where they are located.
Both the Gulf nations and Israel have experienced heavy Iranian missile showers in recent days (though sharply tapering in intensity as the war progresses). According to Davis and Postol, the Iranian missiles so far launched appeared to be old, some even disintegrating on approaching their targets. And yet, the missile clusters pouring over Israel also included the Golden-Dome-busting variety.
All this seems to confirm (1) Iranian claims that it is holding back on deployment of its newer, more advanced projectiles until a later stage in the war; (2) the intercept rate against Iranian drones is very low; and (3) the Gulf appears not simply denuded of air defenses but whatever air defenses they are using are either technically of low quality or are not being skillfully applied: many appear to be hopelessly off-target. Further (4), decoys are also being deployed. These induce a huge waste of interceptors. Sometimes, eight interceptors will be spent on one incoming projectile. Israelis have only a one in 20 chance of choosing the real missile when it is only one among a shower of 20 of which 19 are decoys. The first 36 hours of the war alone consumed over 3,000 US-Israeli munitions.
The US claims it has a 90% success rate in interceptor hits. Throughout his career, Postol has demonstrated evidence time and time again that effectively rubbishes such claims. He cites one Stanford University source (publishing in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, whose Board, Postol points out, is not made up entirely of atomic scientists with relevant military experience and does not submit its articles to peer review) that claims an 87% success rate for the Israeli Golden Dome. Postol puts it closer to 5% (Note that the the Bulletin itself says that it is not a peer-reviewed journal, but that it does send unsolicited articles to colleagues for outside review).
Postol points out that the Israeli Dome interceptors are not always travelling at sufficient speed to take down the missiles they are chasing. Further it is relatively easy using iridium communication systems to guide drones to targets. Half a dozen drones, each carrying a couple of hundred pounds of explosive, can be launched from a single launcher and each can have significant impact on buildings.
In these circumstances, Israel will run out of interceptors in no time. And, of course, so will all other Gulf countries that host US military installations whose presence has always been intended to harass and intimidate Iran.
From other sources we learn that at least up to now US air superiority over Iran has been less pervasive than previously boasted by the US, and that US-Israeli flights directly over US territory are probably far fewer than we had been led to believe. Exacerbating this problem is the fact that Iran has extensively targeted US radar across the region, with a notable hit on a major radar facility in Qatar and that Iranian hits on US radar installations has probably been helped enormously by the provision of satellite data from China and, quite possibly, Russia, whose other forms of help are thought to be continuing.
The downgrading of US radar will complicate US efforts to monitor what is happening on the borders (as in the case of its hoped-for Iraqi-Kurd invasion – see below) and any assistance coming in from Russia or China. The Hegseth-promised arrival of US gravity-bombs is not so close as was indicated by Hegseth a day or so ago.
Oil and Water
Iranian foreign minister Abbas Arghchi indicated a week ago that there have been attempted mediation efforts although we don’t know by whom. Iranian leaders are currently assuring the world of their determination to continue to defend their country from foreign aggression. US President Trump has categorically insisted on Truth Social that the war must continue until Iran surrenders unconditionally and has even said that it is he who must decide who will be Iran’s next leader (!) even as Iran’s selection committee finally selected as replacement for former Supreme Leader Khamenei his son Mojtabi Khamenei. Yet by March 10, it seemed that Trump was sounding out the possibility of a mediation effort from Putin in return for the possibility of a relaxation of US sanctions on Russian energy products (such relaxation still having to take place).
The US sinking on March 4 of the Iranian battleship Iris Denia by submarine torpedo was a strike on a ship participating by invitation from India in naval exercises in the Indian ocean and about 2,000 kilometers from Iran, a ship that Iranian foreign minister Araghchi says was unarmed. The sinking may constitute a war crime in any universe in which there still exists an international legal system capable of making such judgments. The US made no attempt to rescue the 100+ sailors thrown into the sea (whereas in World War Two, Germany typically would attempt to rescue such victims in comparable circumstances). The US failure contravenes the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949.
Iran is likely very unhappy with Modi’s failure to condemn the sinking alongside the alacrity with which India has seized on a temporary lifting of US sanctions on Indian imports of Russian oil and gas in recognition of Indian dependence on the flow of energy products through the Gulf of Hormuz. (Other reports claim that India increased its demand for Russian oil first, and that Trump then “permitted” it).
The incident of the Iris Dena has broader implications than might at first seem evident because it raises the question of what is it, exactly, that the US and its allies represents, what values does this coalition enshrine that support what seems to be their conviction that they are in some way more “advanced,” superior to, the rest of humankind. The Iris Dena sits alongside the US bombing and killing of some 160 elementary school children, and the US murdering of more than 140 people at sea in small boats in the Caribbean, and the US throttling of the nation of Cuba.
In the meantime, Asian buyers of oil – busily negotiating emergency supply arrangements – are reportedly outbidding European in the wake, especially, of the closure of Qatari LNG production (something which will take weeks to recover even if the war ends today, and much longer in the event the war continues for several weeks more). These countries are already looking into and have asserted force majeure clauses that could relieve them of their pathetic promises to invest $billions in the US in return for lower TTT (Trump Terror Tariffs).
Worries are growing in Washington that the crisis reduces the capacity of Taiwan to resist a Chinese invasion. Brent Crude sold at nearly $90 a barrel on March 8 and it was anticipated that it could rise to as much as $200 in the event of prolonged disruption. By the following day, efforts by Trump to talk down the possibility of a long war, the release of reserves by on to international markets by Japan, similar talk from the G7, and indications of a possible mediation by Russia, seemed to have stabilized oil prices (gas, not so much).
The US has engaged in much boasting about its hits on various Iranian warships; its critics argue that the most important components of the Iranian navy are not warships but a fleet of much smaller, faster, more flexible craft. It is reasonable to suppose that US attacks on Iranian craft in the Strait of Hormuz on March 10 have inflicted major damage on Iran’s capacity to mine the Strait. It has not wanted to mine the Strait before now because the Strait is still being used for Iranian oil exports. Mining is not the only way in which a complete closure could be established since Iran has many missile launchers all around the Strait but one has to wonder for how long these can survive US attacks. For the moment, however, the US has not implemented its promise to escort tankers with its warships and there are few if any tanker crews or owners who will want to take that risk.
The US is spending $1 billion a day on the current operation in the Gulf; if the US is now contemplating an engagement of 100 days, then it is looking to a cost of $100 billion, not to mention other ways in which the US and its allies will suffer unplanned costs. The US reputation as the Gulf’s “protector,” and, therefore the Gulf’s reputation as a suitable middleman in global trade, has already been shot to bits. More money for the US war of choice will require additional appropriations (the figure of $50 billion is being canvassed) passed by Congress, a process that will likely give rise to far more discordance – as the country moves closer to the November mid-term elections – than that which met the Democrats’ failed attempt this week to call a vote on whether a war powers bill would be introduced.
The consequences for the Ukraine war are significant given that Russia benefits very considerably from higher prices for its oil and gas. Ukraine will suffer not only from having to pay yet more for energy, but from the fact that Hungary and Slovakia are breaking away even more extremely from the EU in retaliation for Ukraine’s and the EU’s failure to restore passage to them of Russian oil across Ukraine (the Druzhba pipeline). amd om retaliation for Zelenskiy’s angry threats against them and against Hungarian president Orban personally. Ukraine hopes to help unseat Orban in upcoming Hungarian elections.
There was speculation earlier this week as to whether US attacks on Iranian launchers had been so successful as to account for a very significant downturn in Iranian missile and drone attacks after the first day or so of the war. This seems less likely given the scale of Iranian attacks experienced over the past 24 hours or so of my writing these lines. The Iranians claim that many of the launchers that the US and Israel say they have hit so far are decoys. It is far from clear that even if Russian and Chinese aid (certainly of active value in the matter of surveillance) can usefully extend to the replacement of damaged launchers – even assuming Russia and China have launchers to spare – can be a practical consideration, as these need to be appropriately set for the actual missiles that Iran possesses.
Bear in mind that reliable information from Israel is particularly scarce and consider the major significance of reports of a hit on a desalination plant in Bahrein (which, if extended to such plants elsewhere in the Middle East, could cripple the entire Gulf in no time at all). Also, there has been a report of an Israeli hit on a desalination plant in southern Iran. Israel and Iran both have considerable dependencies on desalinated water and if there is to a be a war on desalination alongside the war on energy (currently playing out as Iran hits a Saudi refinery and the US and Israel strike Iranian oil facilities, while there is talk of a possible strike on heavily defended Kharg Island in the Persian Gulf and which is the main terminal for approximately 90% of Iran’s crude oil exports. Talk of a Kurd invasion or uprising is more mooted today (March 8) than yesterday, perhaps reflecting a saner assessment of Kurdish doubts about the wisdom of listening to Trump and of the relatively small numbers that could be mobilized in support of US war aims.
These are among the many reasons why prior to Trump’s decision to light the fuse in Iran advisors warned him that military action could lead to unpredictable, long-term consequences and a potentially uncontrollable, prolonged conflict. People like Joint Chiefs Chairman General Dan Caine and CIA Director Ratcliffe privately expressed concerns that the administration lacked a clear “endgame” plan for the conflict, fearing a scenario where the U.S. would get stuck in a long-term war, like previous, unpopular Middle East engagements. Even while some top officials (including VP JD Vance and Sec. of State Marco Rubio) reportedly fell into line with the administration’s public stance, they originally preached caution, warning of the risks involved in a direct military conflict with Iran. Vance is clearly not a fan and has been instructed by Trump, reportedly, not to call any public meetings for the time being. Advisers have highlighted the obvious fact that the outcome of a “decimated” Iranian regime is not guaranteed to produce a government friendlier to the U.S., creating high uncertainty about the postwar future.
Despite these warnings, reports indicate that Trump opted to move forward with military action, often relying on his own judgment that such actions could be easily won
During March 7 and 8, 2026, Iranian forces and their regional allies conducted a series of missile and drone attacks targeting Gulf nations, U.S. military assets, and Israel as part of an escalating regional conflict. Despite what had been reported as a public apology from President Masoud Pezeshkian and a conditional order to halt strikes on neighbors (unless their territories were used for attacks on Iran), Iranian-launched munitions continued to hit several regional targets.
Prospects for US Hegemony
Perhaps more than any other prominent commentator, Brian Berletic at his site New Atlas has sustained a laser-like focus on what he argues is the essential core of the global geopolitical crisis, which is that of the US determination to restore the glory of its unipolar moment (I’ll date it at 1990-2000), so rudely interrupted when China’s accession to the WTO consolidated its meteoric rise from peasant State to magnificent Cosmopolis and Vladimir Putin concurrently rescued Yeltsin’s Russia from Wall Street.
I absolutely think Berletic is right. This approach does not dwell overly much on the freakish, Epsteinized and patently fascist character of the Trump regime, but on a Deep State neocon agenda that has dominated US foreign policy at least from the Reagan years but, honestly, probably has its roots in Teddy Roosevelt and before, and which dictated the manner of US participation in both World War One and World War Two.
There is an evident turbocharged desperation that drives that agenda today and is inspired, I think it plausible to argue, by fear – fear of the Herculean China-Russia combine and by the BRICS, together with the realization that if the Empire does not strike now, it may very well sink into the merciful (for the global majority) oblivion that its $39 trillion debt invites.
The desperation has accelerated in recent years with US maneuvers with Israel and Turkey to bring down Assad in Syria, constant US meddling in Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen, faithful military support to Israel, and to Israel’s genocidal program against Palestine and Zionist ambitions for a greater Israel; re-ignition of the proxy war with Russia over Ukraine; the humiliating subjugation of Europe to Washington over the end of cheap Russian energy supply for Europe, forcing Europe into dependence on expensive US energy, and the continent’s relative de-industrialization; US threats against Canadian sovereignty and threats to impose US sovereignty over Greenland.
Of particular importance, and constituting Trump originality in this saga is the US lassoing of the globe through the network of Trump Terror Tariffs (which surely will survive whatever pinprick obstacles are put in their way by the US Supreme Court) that have been used not only to extract far more wealth from non-US territories than is economically justified by tenets of free trade, but also to induce commitments from formerly powerful allies and non-allies alike, such as Japan, South Korea, and Vietnam to invest billions of dollars in the US at the direction of the US president and without regard for their merits; the effective seizure of Venezuela and, in particular Venezuelan oil; the sadistic blockade of Cuba; warnings of “narcotics” intervention in Colombia; support for the turn to authoritarianism in Ecuador on the same pretext; threats against Mexican sovereignty, again using the narcotics pretext; the incitement to Pakistan to go to war against Afghanistan’s Taliban (who had previously defeated the US) and, of course and not least, the unprovoked war against Iran which, even as I write, is threatening to destabilize the global economy and perhaps even to terminate 600 years of Western tyranny if Trump actually is as stupid as he usually sounds. To this list, many additions are required, especially in Africa and the current contestations to buttress, assert or imperial power over West Africa, Sudan, Southern Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, Nigeria …. and so on and so on.
A footnote, perhaps, on the question of Israel, since analysts may be forgiven perhaps, in conjecturing, in view of the boundless generosity of the transition of US wealth to Israel, that Israel is the tail that wags the dog. Berletic refuses to go down that rabbit-hole. He points out (and I shall here elaborate the direction of his argument in my own terms) that Israel serves US designs to destabilize the Middle East, help crush entities and interests that might otherwise rival US control and manipulation of Middle Eastern oil (so much in demand by China in particular, even though not much needed directly by the US itself). Israel also helps the US meddle witdh Middle East trade networks even as these are soon to be rivalled by networks across Central Europe and the Arctic. These latter, in turn, help explain US foreign policy machinations from Afghanistan through to Iran, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and beyond, to the unfreezing ice of the Arctic circle.
Though much angst is spilled, understandably, over AIPAC and the Israeli lobby and the Epstein class, Berletic reminds us that this source of corruption of the US political system is dwarfed by more ancient lobbies, the most important of which is the home-grown US military-industrial complex. And even if the domains of US finance and the propaganda-entertainment complex are more than proportionately influenced by Zionists, they are still principally the province of white, Anglo-Saxon males of loosely Christian persuasion. Mossad is still very much the junior partner within the world of intelligence to MI6 and to the CIA and the dozen or so other US intelligence agencies. I do wonder, however, whether there is something especially peculiar, within the Trump orbit, in Trump’s deference to Netanyahu, and his ties to Netanyahu through his son-in-law Jared Kushner and the Kushner family’s long-standing relationship to Netanyahu.
Implications for Russia and Ukraine
The implications for the other major conflict in the world right now – Ukraine – are considerable. Britain (having first declined Trumpian overtures, then prevaricating, then being told by Trump that the US doesn’t need Britain’s help anyway), France and Germany are lining up in exhibition of their fanatical vassalage to the US, offering to join in to help the US against Iran. On March 9, Macron was directing the French navy towards the Gulf to help “defensively” – by which he appears to mean that the French can be useful only after the worst of the fighting is over (in favor, he assumes, of the coalition). This is a continuation of previous European service in sustaining, for the benefit of the US and Israel, the false myth of the “Iran is a nuclear threat” meme (Iran has never had a nuclear weapon, Israel has hundreds), and forcing Iran, in effect, to capitulate over the JCPOA (which Trump then promptly sabotaged during his first administration, following up this abuse by assassinating, in a non-combat context, Iran’s revered principal military leader, Qasem Suleimani).
Europe’s participation in the Iranian conflict will surely further reduce whatever remaining sources of military and financial support the European powers can still direct towards Ukraine, even as some European countries (Hungary and Slovakia) contemplate the possibility of outright conflict with Ukraine rather than with Russia.
Russia meantime is finding in the Iranian crisis a treasure trove of possibility and opportunity as prices for Russian oil and gas soar. The prospects for the Zelenskiy regime in Kiev, therefore, look dicier than they have ever done at any previous time in this conflict. A Russian victory in Ukraine will undermine the authority and the capability of the US everywhere else, especially if it takes place at a moment of economic catastrophe that threatens the viability of the current economic order of things.
Russia is in a peculiar situation in this war on Iran given, first, that it is benefitting from the rise in oil and gas prices that have resulted and although it has a strategic partnership with Iran and is furnishing Iran with intelligence and material aid, yet its most vital ally China, is losing as a result of being cut off from at least some of its supply of Iranian oil, and another ally, Iran itself, is suffering horribly from the unprovoked attacks on it by the US and Israel. Further, Russia is compelled to take account of the broader dangers to the global economy which may threaten Russia itself further down the line and may present opportunities to Putin to deal with Trump over Ukraine, even though virtually everybody else considers any form of negotiation with the US either a complete waste of time or actively inadvisable.
In view of the tightrope Putin must cross in order to achieve whatever Russian objectives actually are (and when it comes to Putin one has to concede that we may not know what these are), perhaps we should extend our patience to Putin even as Iran burns, its economy is destroyed, its people are murdered and the global economy is wrecked. The possibility (and it may hardly be one at the moment), of a Putin collaboration with Trump in attempting to mediate the conflict in return for a lifting of sanctions on Russian oil could undermine Iran’s war objectives by stabilizing energy prices, granting the US more time and resources to continue the war with Iran and improving Trump’s prospects in the mid-terms.
The increase in oil and gas prices that has already occurred and the lifting of US sanctions on Russian oil may be sufficient to help Russia complete its military objectives in Ukraine. The trilateral talks previously scheduled to take place in Istanbul this week have been cancelled (there is still talk of a resumption next week). Zelenskiy, who had previously expressed his unhappiness about these talks, is now protesting their cancellation. Meantime, Zelenskiy’s position has been further degraded by the failure of Europe, so far, to deliver its promised $90+ billion loan. This is on account of problems raised by France and by rising tensions between both Hungary and Slovakia against Ukraine. Europe might be able to resolve this by helping Ukraine reopen the Druzhba pipeline (after repairs), although this would simply provide Russia with even more money for its exports to Hungary and Slovakia. EU Commissioner Ursula von der Leyen has been signaling a willingness to settle the Druzhba dispute but still has to deal with an obdurate Zelenskiy. On the ground, Russian attacks in Ukraine are intensifying and will continue to do so as weather improves; preparations for a Spring offensive are under way.
Trump’s Call to Putin
Talking to Trump was what Putin was doing (albeit in response to a call from Trump) on March 9, the first time that the two leaders had had a direct conversation since the US-backed assault on Putin’s Valdai residence and nuclear control and command center on December 28-29, even though many in Russia have grown increasingly impatient with Putin’s stubborn persistence in trying to find a reasonable side to the US administration. Note that the recent Storm Shadow attacks on Bryansk occurred the same day as Trump talked to Putin, raising the possibility that the call was merely a Trump strategy to talk down oil prices and furthe humilitate Putin. The conversation took place after Putin had noted that Russia is increasing supplies of oil and gas to countries in several regions of the world and that it will continue to do this for those countries who prove to be reliable counterparties. Commodity prices are temporary and what matters to Russia and Russian oil companies, in Putin’s view, is stability.
Trump, presumably in need of his help, made the call after Putin had delivered such comments to the Duma. Details were later made available by Putin’s aide Ushakov. The call lasted an hour and has been characterized by the Kremlin as businesslike, frank and constructive. The focus was on both the crisis in Iran and negotiations in Ukraine. Trump expressed interest in a quick ceasefire in Ukraine (something which Putin has previously and consistently rejected) and Putin praised Trump’s efforts to bring about peace (slather, slather…). But the focus of the conversation was Iran. Trump would have been aware of Putin’s view that the war on Iran is very undesirable, not least because it was initiated during negotiations, and that Russia is on Iran’s side. No agreements were reached. Putin did indicate that he was in an effective position to mediate, though clearly, he cannot guarantee a favorable outcome. He must dout that US has any remaining capability in, or inclination for, any kind of good faith settlement, especially given the influence over Washington policy of raving fanatics such as Senator Lyndsey Graham.
After the call, Trump announced that he would lift sanctions on Russia (though we don’t yet know whether this has actually been implemented or whether Trump is simply attempting short-term manipulation of energy markets) and would waive oil sanctions on certain countries during the crisis, adding that perhaps after the crisis there would be no need to reimpose them – suggesting that Trump may see here an off-ramp from his ridiculous TTT (Trump Terror Tariffs) policies that have been deemed illegal by the Supreme Court. If we want to be optimistic, we may speculate whether we may be witnessing the end of the economic war waged by the political West against the rest.
Trump has also said that US warships might have to escort ships through the Strait of Hormuz. Here, the only ships that are being allowed by Iran to pass are Chinese and Iranian tankers (presumably from Kharg Island which has not yet been attacked by the coalition, perhaps because it is well guarded but also, perhaps, because its destruction would render moot any US advantage in taking control of Iranian oil exports). The US has been hitting vessels carrying Iranian oil to Iranian clients overseas, including China.
Iran has told its Gulf neighbors that if they want to secure passage through the Strait, they should expel the US and Israeli ambassadors to their countries. This will not be sufficient for Iran to cease bombing US assets on their territories. If these neighbors want to stop Iranian bombing, says Iran, then they must take over these US facilities to stop their use against Iran. These options are offered as the UAE faces a humanitarian catastrophe; and fresh food in this region will run out within the next few days – there is only ten days’ worth of fresh produce left in Dubai.
In the meantime, the US is bringing more military assets to the area and is to be joined by the French navy (the UK has decided against doing the same, perhaps reflecting the tenuous electoral position of the British Labor party and its Prime Minister Keir Starmer).
While Iran has continued to hit targets in the Gulf region, striking primarily at energy infrastructure, taking down buildings and so on (having previously destroyed many US radar installations), the physical damage that is being inflicted on it by the US on infrastructure and even residential districts is far more severe and poses the possibility that we are witnessing the utter destruction of Iran as we know it – to be followed, perhaps, by an era of guerilla or slow, attritional war that may still be insufficiently forceful to prevent Trump from declaring victory or seeking to slow the pace of consolidation of a Greater Israel (why would he?).
Among most recent developments in Iran the U.S. and Israel have launched massive waves of strikes targeting Tehran and other key military and government sites. Iranian officials claim approximately 1,300 people have been killed in Iran since the start of operations. Some four thousand have been injured in Tehran alone. The Pentagon reports that 140 service members have been wounded, with seven deaths recorded so far. Iran has responded with missile and drone strikes targeting Israel, regional U.S. bases, and Gulf nations. The UAE reported intercepting eight ballistic missiles and 26 drones on Tuesday March 10 alone. Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence announced the arrest of 30 alleged “spies and enemy agents” linked to the U.S. and Israel. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has declared that negotiations with Washington are “off the table,” describing past talks as a “very bitter experience”. Iran has begun laying mines in the Strait of Hormuz, a critical shipping lane for global oil. President Trump has threatened an “unprecedented military response” if the blockade continues. Crude oil prices have been highly volatile, surging past $100 per barrel before dipping following mixed signals from President Trump about the war ending “soon.” Nearly 700,000 people have fled Israeli strikes in Lebanon as the conflict widens to include Iran-linked groups like Hezbollah.
In all this, the UN appears to be a tragic cipher.
(Featured Image: “030323-N-6946M-002” by mashleymorgan is licensed under CC BY-SA 2.0.)
