There is a growing crescendo of chatter as to the possibility of peace in NATO’s proxy war against Russia over the bodies of hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians. These latter are also dying as they are shot by Ukrainian forces when trying in desperation to flee Ukraine, or to abandon indefensible positions, or to resist brutish military press-gangs.
Most such chatter to which we are exposed in the West reflects all-and-sundry’s voices rather than those of Russians living in Russia. Speaking for Russia, President Putin has made its position clear which is, for the moment, that as soon as Ukraine accepts neutrality and removes its forces from the four oblasts that it integrated on September 30, 2022, there will be an immediate ceasefire and then negotiations on the other matters (de-armament, de-nazification) can proceed.
It is a generous offer. Personally, I don’t think it goes nearly far enough so far as the protection of Russian security interests are concerned. Perhaps Putin never expected that it would be seriously considered by Ukraine. Nor has it. Or perhaps, being a consummate politician and a realist, Putin knows the limits and that life is short.
Some Ukrainian and Western commentators are slowly coming around to the view that Zelenskiy’s insistence on a return to the 1991 borders is beginning to seem, and is, ridiculous. They are beginning to acknowledge that for the war to end there must be territorial concessions — perhaps the four oblasts that have been integrated already, plus Crimea, or perhaps — as Zalmay Khalilzad (that rotting corpse of the US occupation of Afghanistan) suggested the other day — UNSC protection for the four oblasts (subject to some kind of Ukrainian agreement to be nice, an idea that admittedly may invite giggles), or some kind of autonomy for the oblasts within the state of Ukraine. This latter is what Minsk was all about and which the West and Ukraine have long shown is repugnant to them. Not because there was anything remotely bad about it, but because it got in the way of Nazi ideas about pure Ukraine blood, and didn’t exactly promote the Western wet dream of a dismantling of the Russian Federation.
Khalilzad wants normalization of Russia’s relations with the West, giving the impression that it is Russia’s responsibility to “normalize.” If so, then it is an extreme demonstration of the collective West’s inability to comprehend that the West is: (1) not superior to everyone else, after all; (2) it cannot even win wars any more; (3) its color revolutions (as just attempted, yet again, in Venezuela) rouse derision and anger almost everywhere but in the collective West itself, and (4) that the world is undergoing a titanic shift from an utterly discredited, incompetent, inhumane US hegemony to a far more hopeful and egalitarian era of multipolarity. This can not only bring prosperity to the majority, but can also begin to tackle the most serious of threats against the human species, including nuclear war and global heating.
The optimistic perspectives of Western analysts, whose ideas might rescue Ukraine from a dire situation without loss of face, leave it still able to join NATO (or, at least, enter into bilateral security agreements that might compensate for NATO membership) or, if not NATO, then the EU. NATO membership, an existential issue for Russia, is simply out of the question. Hopes for the EU seem badly misplaced on the face of it. Ukraine’s level of debt to GDP is 25% whereas the EU’s rules of membership expressly forbid membership to any claimant whose debt exceeds 3% of GDP. Furthermore, some existing EU members do not want their alliance burdened with having to prop up one of the most corrupt and bankrupt regimes on the planet because this may, at the end of the day, bankrupt them.
In support of their optimism, Western analysts may cite sources like Zelenskiy’s rival, Vitaly Klitschko, who speculates that Zelenskiy may eventually have to resort to a referendum that seeks Ukrainian consent to territorial concessions. Who would have thought there could be a democratic solution in Ukraine or that anyone in power should care what Ukrainians actually want?
Or Western analysts may reference Ukrainian foreign minister Kuleba’s visit to China amid Ukrainian support for a “One China” policy, its concession to Beijing’s position on Taiwan, and weighing of the possible advantages for Ukraine were it to participate in China’s Belt and Road initiative. China’s foreign minister Wang Yi has been gently encouraging, while noting that “conditions and time are not yet ripe for negotiations.” Wangh is due soon to visit Kiev.
Again, Western analysts may observe, hopefully, the visits by Hungary’s Prime Minister Orban (currently president of the EU) to both Kiev, Moscow, and Beijing, even if this rare act of actual diplomacy was rudely snubbed by EU apparatchiks. Or they look hopefully to the recent visit to Kiev by the foreign minister of Saudi Arabia and, soon to come, that of the Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi. Or they can cite Boris Johnson, the architect of the implosion of otherwise very promising peace talks in Istanbul just a few weeks after the war started in 2022, as saying that he thought that a Trump presidency would bring about an end to the war.
Western analysists of a peaceful predisposition may note that Zelenskiy is proposing a second “peace conference” this autumn. For this second conference, generously, invitations to both Russia and China would be forthcoming.
For the previous conference in Switzerland in June, Russia was not invited and China did not come. Zelenskiy’s 10-point plan for peace (bottom line: back to 1991 borders and Russia pays reparations) were reduced to three, and only 78 nations signed up to (but not necessarily truly agreeing with) the final communique. The remainder did not sign or simply did not show up.
Zelenskiy’s sudden flurry of diplomatic initiative (without the least sign of compromise on the 1991 borders) is also a signal of desperation. Even as Ukrainian soldiers continue to die on the battlefield and will presumably continue to do so for the forseeable future, a growing number of Western media and Western political and military sources are coming to the view that the war is essentially lost to Russia.
Yet Zelenskiy’s methodology of “peace making” is literally absurd. It demonstrates an absence of good faith on his part. It demonstrates his greater interest in public relations, in looking good while he hopes his opponents will look not so good, rather than actually solving anything or saving lives. It exposes to the entire world a process that, were it to be serious, would be quiet, barely visible, confidential. Zelenskiy, ever the comedian, wants to “play to the gallery,” but hasn’t noticed, or does not care, that his audience is headed for the exits in a burning theater.
One imagines that the Kremlin finds all this very amusing.
Russia has not opposed negotiations; Russia is not demanding that Ukraine surrender. As noted above, it has stated its terms with great clarity. Yet nobody of authority in Ukraine or in the collective West can bring themselves to talk about these terms with Russia itself or, for that matter, with anyone. Instead, they largely refuse to talk about them. They talk about other ideas that have occurred to them, but they talk about these amongst themselves.
Such introversion is customarily accompanied with a betrayal of ignorance both as to the real origins of the war (which I have covered, ad nauseum now, for two years) and as to what is happening on the battlefields — that is, a huge potential invasion army poised for action along Russia’s borders with Ukraine, another large concentration of Russian troops in Zapporizhzhia also poised for action; and imminent Russian victories over key Ukrainian fortified positions, settlements and towns all along the combat lines — most critically, in the vicinities of Vovchansk, Kupyansk, Lyman, Siversk, Chasiv Yar, Pokrov, Niu-York, Toretsk, Urozhaine, Robotyne and west of Kherson.
I suspect that Russia finds that this long combat line and Russia’s own plodding progress aligns well with the logic of attritional war. It is to Russia’s advantage that it does not complete all the battles that it starts. If it did, then Ukraine could redeploy its forces in favor of other, more promising points of defense, and staunch the shocking loss of men and machines that it surely suffers. These losses are far higher than those of Ukraine, as is obvious to anyone who follows the MediaZona assessments of Russian losses along with relentless news of the crumbling of Ukrainian resistance, even if we can invest only an uncertain faith in the assessments of Ukrainian losses that are issued by the Russian Ministry of Defense.
Conditions in Ukraine are close to desperate. If there is a Harris presidency after November, the probability of more robust financial and military aid to Ukraine is relatively high. Which is to say: good enough to keep the war going, to keep Ukrainians dying, to keep standing on the precipice of nuclear annihilation, to keep pushing the Ukraine economy into Noddy-land. Trump and Vance, on the other hand, make statements that suggest they would seek an early end to the War. But they cannot possibly know this, because they are not talking to Putin and are not addressing Putin’s terms for peace. Instead, magical thinking informs them that if they threaten Kiev with total loss of support should it resist negotiations, or if they threaten Moscow with a “relentless” and perpetual flow of US military support for Ukraine should Russia fail to come to terms with Ukraine, that Putin will immediately jump in their desired direction.
Ukraine has recently agreed to a restructuring of its external debt with bondholders, still leaving it with a $12 billion budget deficit. It is expecting an aid package from the US of nearly $2 billion. The Pentagon claims it was able to scrape this together after the identification of “accounting errors,” at least the second time that such a lucky break has occurred. This is totally unbelievable of course, given that it comes from an institution that excels in lying, has never yet satisfactorily passed an audit for its expenditures of trillions of dollars over recent years, and is fundamentally an unaccountable incubus on the backs of the American people and the world.
Zelenskiy complains about the slow pace of arms deliveries. This is hardly surprising since so much military aid to Ukraine has first to be ordered (mainly from US arms manufacturers), then manufactured, and then delivered. Of 80 F-16s promised to Ukraine by the West, only 20 are expected to arrive before the end of 2024. Only 26 Ukrainian pilots have been trained to fly them (training will have been minimal) and only 10 combat missions are anticipated before year end. Many of the machines, even if modernized, are very old. The extended airstrips they need to fly from have been badly damaged by recent Russian attacks.
Russia has knocked out 90% of Ukrainian power that is generated by non-nuclear power stations. How can you maintain an air force and air defenses in such a situation? Lack of power forces Ukraine to switch energy from one part of the country to another, and to import energy from countries like Hungary, Slovakia and Romania that Ukraine is depriving of the energy they purchase from Russia through Russian pipelines that cross Ukraine.
It is estimated that it will take Ukraine two years to fix its power system. Blackouts of up to 20 hours a day are anticipated for this coming winter.
Other upcoming payments expected by Ukraine include a $2.26 billion tranche from the IMF, and the first tranche of aid, $1.4 billion, based on the interest earned on seized Russian assets, and an overall loan, eventually, of $50 billion. Ultimately, as I argued in a recent post, it will be the West that ends up shouldering these debts, even as the burden of NATO’s war with Russia continues to cripple the German economy (almost into recession, again) and other European economies.
Meanwhile, the introduction by Russia of a new and progressive tax system (including, most significantly, an increase in the taxes payable by corporations) is estimated will increase the flow of funds to the Russian state by 1-2%, a sum that will dwarf the losses of its seized assets. US sanctions have clearly failed to achieve their objectives. Russian sales of oil and gas have been more than compensated for by the expansion of its energy markets in India and China, the re-sale of oil and gas through third parties, continuing sales through pipelines to Europe, and the sale of Russian LNG at prices far higher than ordinary pipeline deliveries. Russian revenues from oil and gas were reported to have increased by more than 80% in February compared with 2023, surpassing US$10 billion. This increase was due to the increase in prices on Russian oil despite Western sanctions.
The New York Times has confirmed very recently that Western technology continues to flow to Russia through “underground” routes, many of them involving Hong Kong. $4 billion’s worth of restricted chips from 6,000 companies have reached Russia, the same now as in 2021. Intensely annoying as this may be to the US, the US itself has to send chips to China for manufacturing, packaging and assembly.
The strengthening of Russia’s economy, even as Europe stagnates or, as in the case of Germany, continues to flirt with recession, together with Russian success in military and economic wars of attrition against both Ukraine and the collective West, in a context of stumbling if not downright inept leadership in the USA and in Europe, could have been expected, by now, to have motivated Ukraine to seek terms while it still can.
But this has not yet happened. And if it does not happen, Russia must and will press further westwards.
This may happen more quickly than seemed likely until recently, but it will still be a fairly ponderous process. This is, in part, a reflection of just how long the combat line has become; it is a reflection of greater evidence of Russian concern for the lives of its men than is the case of Ukraine; it is a reflection of Russian preference for a war of attrition above territorial gain; it is an expression of a naturally conservative approach by Putin, who has so far managed to quell the rising chorus of Russian public demand for tougher and more relentless action in Ukraine.
Yet, once again, Zelenskiy and his entourage (Budanov foremost amonst them), rather than undertake a serious bid for a settlement, look to terrorism and screaming headlines. We do not know what exactly was at stake a week ago when the Kremlin reached out to US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, apparently to find out whether the US knew of and was encouraging something awful that Ukraine was contemplating doing.
Some have speculated that this might have been about a plan to assassinate Putin or Medvedev or some other very high ranking Russian official, or that Ukraine was readying a direct attack on Russian nuclear facilities, or was to launch a major attack on Moscow or Saint Petersburg, presumably to cause large numbers of civilian fatalities.
Well, we just don’t know. But if Ukraine is, indeed, contemplating something of this kind, then it seems not to understand that the Kremlin will be subject all the more to public pressure on it to expedite a major invasion from both the north and the south that would wrest the entirety of Ukraine east of the Dnieper from Kiev control and, very possibly, bring about the end of a US-dependent Kiev and involve the taking of Kharviv and Odessa leaving Russia with the quandary of what it can do with western Ukraine and its other European enemies.
Just as in the Middle East, where Netanyahu tries to embroil the US directly in a war that Israel instigates by means of a false flag operation against Iran, so as to guarantee Israel the support and resources necessary, as it may imagine, to overcome its regional enemies (a guarantee it currently lacks), so too in Ukraine Zelenskiy may hope in one way or another to provoke Russia into such a major offensive that the US and the collective West consider themselves obliged to enter the combat directly.
On every count, so far, Ukraine and the collective West, in both these scenarios of a potential World War Three, have shown shockingly poor judgment. The Israeli assassinations of a leader of Hamas in Tehran, and of Hezbollah in Beirut, may indeed constitute the final trigger for just such a calamity.
(Featured Image: “Zelensky, Merkel, Macron, Putin, (2019-12-10) 01” by Пресс-служба Президента Российской Федерации is licensed under CC BY 4.0.)
