Since Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 Vladimir Putin has spoken several times about using nuclear weapons. However, the initial attention and concern that global news media gave to Putin when he first spoke on the issue in September 2022 has largely dissipated.

For those interested in the study of propaganda, Putin’s threats appear to have moved from what Dan Hallin called the ‘sphere of legitimate controversy’, where the validity of an utterance is urgently debated by journalists, politicians and academics, into the ‘sphere of consensus’, where virtually all commentators agree upon the utterance’s meaning – so called ‘repetition priming’ as part of a propaganda strategy – and therein give it less attention.

This is a dangerous assumption – laden in confirmation bias – and one that provides a good opportunity to examine the political and public relationship with nuclear weapons in more detail.

The psychology of nuclear threat

Most adults know of the existence of nuclear weapons and understand the consequences of their use. Very few are simply ignorant – having never heard of them or their immense power.

Jean Paul Sartre argued that instances of denial and self-deception are always partial, existing within a duality of simultaneously knowing and not-knowing. The ‘knowing’ may appear in different ways. Perhaps begrudgingly acknowledged when pressed, or it may manifest in unhelpful ways like addiction, self-harm or fixation upon trivial matters.

Global annihilation – by nuclear genocide, ecocide or natural disaster – exists within this paradigm. It is too overwhelming to think about other than fleetingly resulting in people busying themselves with lesser than existential concerns. However, these denials and self-deceptions affect political outlooks.

Every so often the leader of a nuclear-armed country is asked by a journalist or another politician about their readiness to press the nuclear button. They always say ‘yes’. When this question is asked in front of an audience there is usually enthusiastic applause. This response – applauding the end of the world and an individual’s willingness to be the instigator – is perhaps the most compelling evidence of the duality that the threat of nuclear war exists within. Rather than perceiving such a response as the worrying sign that a misanthropic maniac has somehow manoeuvred their way into high office and should be immediately removed, the voter claims the utterance as a signifier of leadership strength. Sartre would however argue that the applause actually represents an outpouring of relief and approval that this mass deception can continue, and that the inconvenient truth has not been exposed.

Fear propaganda and confirmation bias

During the Cold War official propaganda placed great emphasis upon threat and preparedness for nuclear attack. The BBC film Threads first aired forty years ago in September 1984 and depicted the aftermath of a nuclear strike. It was responsible for great alarm among the British public at a time when news media, movies and even official literature were also focused upon the threat of nuclear war.

Accompanied by short films, between 1974 – 1980 the UK government issued a booklet entitled, ‘Protect and Survive’. The BBC, in its public service role, also ran documentary programming including a 1980 edition of Panorama called ‘If the bomb drops’. While US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s thesis ‘Nuclear War and Foreign Policy’ caused alarm for arguing that small-scale nuclear war using “battlefield” weapons might be possible.

Cold War communications like these served to focus the public mind towards the ‘haunting’ threat of nuclear attack above all other fears. And perhaps they were right to do so. However, over thirty years have now passed since the end of the Cold War and the emphasis within fear propaganda has diluted to other threats like extremism, pandemics and migration from certain other parts of the world.

Putin’s nuclear threats thus provide propaganda analysts with case study data about the important role played by fear propaganda in determining what publics are scared of. The conclusion being that political leaders cannot rely on their words alone to be taken seriously. A wider supportive propaganda environment must also be present.

Putin the ‘madman’

Questions around how to understand Putin’s nuclear attack threats ought to be positioned as the latest in a long(ish) line of world leaders who have tried to convince global publics of their readiness to commit nuclear genocide.

Richard Nixon, for example, used what was referred to as ‘madman’ tactics when trying to convince people of his readiness to push the button. Whereas the depictions of Vladimir Putin, Kim Jong Un and other authoritarian leaders as madmen by Western tabloids often serves as helpful compensation for their countries’ usually inferior military prowess compared to the NATO alliance. No one in the West really thought that Nixon was mad though. Herein, there are elements of double standard. When the leaders nuclear-armed allied nations state a willingness to use nuclear weapons they are widely applauded. When the leader of a rival power says the same they are considered mad and dangerous. It is within this hypocrisy that Sartre’s sense of ‘knowing’ also reveals itself.

Do not think for a moment though that any of this discussion of propaganda increases or decreases the actual threat posed by nuclear weapons. Indeed, there exists a degree of confirmation bias among politicians, journalists and other public commentators that because nuclear war did not happen during the Cold War, it is unlikely to happen now. But this cannot be guaranteed and it may be that these conclusions refer to the intensity of the propaganda environment – not the actuality of the threat posed.

To this end, it ought to be remembered that the ability to press the button sits well within the capacity of the sane human mind. US President Harry S. Truman did push the button in 1945. He was then given detailed reports of the death and destruction that his decision caused to Hiroshima. Then he pushed the button again to annihilate Nagasaki.

An edited version of this article was originally published in The Conversation

(Featured Image: “Nuclear Fallout Shelter, Salem MA” by Maximilian Goldmann is licensed under CC BY 2.0.)

Author

  • Colin Alexander, PhD, is Senior Lecturer in Political Communications at Nottingham Trent University. He has spent much of his academic career writing about propaganda and political communications more broadly in various historical and contemporary circumstances. Beyond this, he is interested in communication ethics, critical philanthropy studies, colonialism and the British colonial experience. He is the author of China and Taiwan in Central America: Engaging Foreign Publics in Diplomacy (2014) and Administering Colonialism and War (2019). He is also the editor of The Frontiers of Public Diplomacy: Hegemony, Morality and Power in the International Sphere (2021). During the pandemic he became one of the most prominent in-post British academics to critically discuss the role of propaganda in manufacturing public compliance. His Coronavirus Propaganda blog series is available here: https://www.ntu.ac.uk/staff-profiles/arts-humanities/colin-alexander

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