Canada and Europe
The European Commission, jubilant at its undemocratic embrace of Canada (who bothered to ask Canada, and who bothered to ask Europeans?) as the EU’s first associate member, has categorically ruled out reopening the Nord Stream pipeline and, scoffing at horrified critics of Europe’s suicidal impulses, firmly states that Russian gas will not flow through it into Europe even after the war in Ukraine comes to an end. Perhaps by that time, following the next upcoming, unprovoked and surely catastrophic US-Israeli attack on Iran, similarly suicidal, fuel will be so expensive that Europe won’t be able to afford it anyway, even as it slides into a (potentially) unusually frigid winter.
This decision, announced by Brussels, explicitly counters a joint push by the United States and Russia to revive the project. So this, alongside the embrace of Canada, is a further apparent rebuff of the US by the EU. The European Commission, locking itself fast in its own idiotic and stubborn inflexibility, clarified that its phase-out strategy for Russian fossil fuels remains legally binding, independent of any future peace agreements or negotiations.
The EU has enacted strict legislation to ban all pipeline imports of Russian gas by September 2027. Furthermore, remaining valid pipeline gas contracts must officially end by September. Unelected EU officials claimed that the decision stems from having learned (really, are they even capable of learning?) the “hidden costs” of energy dependency on Moscow, noting that fossil fuel supplies have repeatedly been weaponized (by Europe against Europe?). Restarting any supplies via the Baltic Sea infrastructure would require fundamental changes to EU law, which Brussels has firmly rejected. It would seem that the hallmark of European civilization is that no law can ever be changed or ignored, except of course that it is constantly being changed or ignored whenever it suits European technocrats as in the case of Kosovan independence and also, in a circuitous way that favors Brussels, in Donald Tusk’s battle with Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal.
The proposed deepening of ties between Canada and the European Union – variously labeled as an “associate membership” by EU Commission President Ursually Vondamentally Lieying, or an “Alliance for the Future” by Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney – carries significant strategic and commercial implications for Canada’s energy markets. While member states (led by Germany) recently pushed to scrub the formal title “associate membership” from summit texts to avoid legal precedents, the underlying substance remains a push for a sector-by-sector “ever closer association”.
For Canada’s energy sector, this closer relationship signals distinct opportunities and challenges. All this, of course, is taking place against the context of TTT (Trump Tariff Terror). The U.S.–Canada trade war remains active with tit-for-tat tariffs up to 50%, though the Trump administration began easing duties on select Canadian goods on October 30, 2026, while high-level trade negotiations remain stalled.
The US currently levies 25% to 50% tariffs on major Canadian exports – including autos, steel, aluminum, timber, and 50% Section 338 duties on $20 billion–$27.6 billion worth of goods. On October 31st., the White House lifted 50% tariffs on a targeted subset of Canadian goods ahead of the U.S. midterms – including plywood sheets, certain paper products, refrigeration equipment, and packing crates – at the request of lawmakers like Senator Susan Collins. At the same time, new tariffs were introduced on other items like carpets and waste products. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s government has previously implemented matching “dollar-for-dollar” counter-tariffs (ranging from 15% to 50%, with 50% on US steel and aluminum) on approximately $20 billion–$27.6 billion in US imports.
Trump has claimed trade talks are progressing and that a deal could come together soon, while US economic advisor Kevin Hassett has asserted the sides were close to an agreement. Prime Minister Mark Carney and Canadian officials state that key elements remain unresolved, “red lines” were crossed in the August proposals, and that Canada is not ready to sign a deal that does not protect Canadian workers and interests. Industry sources and officials have noted that no final agreement is expected before the November 3, 2026 U.S. midterm elections.
The possibility of a stronger alliance between Canada and Europe, if one puts aside for one moment Europe’s absurd posture of civilizational superiority and purity, can certainly offer advantageous compensations for Trumpian suicidal aggression against Canada and against Europe. A primary objective for Canada is establishing the commercial certainty needed to build infrastructure. Deeper integration could encourage European utilities to shift away from short-term spot markets and sign long-term Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) and hydrogen purchase agreements with Canadian producers. These long-term contracts provide investors with the predictable revenue required to finance expensive capital projects, such as export terminals and matching pipeline networks.
Neo-Colonial Rebellion
In short, Canada has found a major rival client to offset its dependence on the USA, and Europe has found a rival supplier to offset its current dependence on swaggering overlord, the USA.
Canada currently lacks an active operational LNG export terminal on its Atlantic coast capable of directly shipping to Europe. So that is clearly an impediment. Major projects, such as LNG Canada in British Columbia, are structurally oriented toward Asia. But a closer alliance with Europe formalizes framework agreements for international cargo swaps. For example, German or European buyers can buy Canadian West Coast LNG destined for Asia and trade it with Asian utilities for an equivalent Atlantic Basin cargo already headed to Europe. Over the longer term, explicit European investment and volume commitments could revive the commercial and political case for building an Atlantic Canadian LNG terminal.
Canada aims to balance its fossil fuel exports by absorbing European expertise in low-carbon sectors. Prime Minister Carney has explicitly stated that Canada expects to benefit from Europe’s “established leadership” in clean energy technologies, particularly in carbon capture, tidal power, and smart grid infrastructure. The reality, of course, is that China is the undisputed global leader in clean energy technology manufacturing and deployment, producing over 90% of the world’s solar components, 83% of battery production capacity, and nearly three-quarters of wind power technologies.
Building on Canada’s existing association with the €95.5-billion Horizon Europe research program, closer alignment will funnel joint research funding into next-generation battery technologies, nuclear fuels, and advanced hydrogen transport systems.
The most significant hurdle for Canadian energy firms under a deeper partnership will be compliance. To enjoy frictionless energy trade and access European capital, Canada may have to align more closely with strict European environmental, carbon-accounting, and product regulations. Adapting to EU standards could spark domestic friction, particularly regarding upstream methane emissions and indigenous land consultations required for new pipeline corridors. Some analysts worry that transportation costs and political hurdles to pipeline construction could still negate the benefits of a closer European alliance.
The entire push for this alliance is driven by a desire to insulate energy and critical mineral supply chains from geopolitical volatility. For Canada, the partnership acts as a crucial hedge to reduce its overwhelming economic and infrastructure dependence on the United States, especially amidst looming American tariff threats. It provides a framework for coordinated defense against energy supply disruptions and economic coercion, positioning Canada as Europe’s premier, democratically stable alternative for critical transition inputs.
The China Factor
Potential impediments to the closer alliance between Canada and Europe raises the question as to why, then, does Canada not pay more attention to China?
The answer is that it already does to a limited extent, and that perhaps Europe needs to do so also. A more intense and visible move towards China requires an ideological leap – and perhaps an equally daring leap, too, from the imperial embrace of the US – that is beyond the current capability of either Canada or Europe.
Mark Carney is already shifting Canada away from the deep freeze of previous years in relations with China, while managing ongoing national security and trade friction. Carney’s administration has focused on diversifying Canada’s trade beyond the United States, targeting a 50% expansion in exports to China by 2030, though full implementation remains uneven. Merchandise trade between Canada and China reached $125.7 billion in 2025, with Canadian merchandise exports totaling $35.0 billion and services trade hitting $13.8 billion.
In early 2026, Canada and China resumed high-level exchanges and introduced mutual tariff adjustments. China reduced tariffs on Canadian canola seed, canola meal, peas, lobster, and crab, while Canada adjusted import rates for Chinese electric vehicles (EVs) and extended select tariff relief on steel and aluminum. Following a leadership-level meeting, Ottawa and Beijing outlined a framework for cooperation centered on energy, clean technology, climate competitiveness, and academic exchanges (such as the long-standing Canada-China Scholars’ Exchange Program). High-level dialogues have resumed, including visits by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi to Ottawa and bilateral consultations through the Joint Economic and Trade Commission (JETC). Ottawa has explicitly ruled out military cooperation and security exchanges with China, citing persistent risks of foreign interference, transnational repression, and intellectual property theft.
Foreign investment from China remains strictly blocked or heavily scrutinized in sensitive areas such as artificial intelligence, defense, and space technologies. Canada’s warming commercial track with Beijing has drawn scrutiny from Washington, particularly regarding rules of origin and potential Chinese industrial back-doors into the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA).
The Arctic Factor
The issue of Arctic access is a major underlying geopolitical leverage point in the US-Canada trade dispute, one in which the potential of Canada for Europe may seem to outweigh that of China. As receding polar ice opens new shipping corridors and exposes vast natural resources, the Arctic has transformed from a quiet cooperative zone into a high-stakes bargaining chip and security flashpoint. Arctic access, sovereignty, and regional infrastructure factor into the ongoing tariff war through several distinct strategic dimensions. The core of the Arctic friction revolves around the legal status of the Northwest Passage. Ottawa maintains that this consists of internal Canadian waters under its full sovereignty, granting it the exclusive right to regulate shipping, collect transit fees, and enforce environmental laws. The US insists the passage is an international strait, advocating for total freedom of navigation without Canadian interference. As the Trump administration applies heavy economic coercion through 25% to 50% tariffs, Canadian analysts view the pressure as an attempt to force concessions on Arctic navigation rights and continental defense control.
The Trump administration has frequently criticized Canada for being vulnerable to US rivals in the Arctic and under-contributing to continental defense. In response to the tariff war and U.S. pressure, Carney’s government has actively accelerated military spending to bolster its Arctic sovereignty. Canada is investing tens of billions of dollars into under-ice submarines, long-range polar surveillance aircraft, and upgraded Arctic radar stations. This military buildup aims to prove that Canada can defend its own northern borders from Russia and China, stripping Washington of its national security justification for aggressive trade tactics and potential naval incursions into the Northwest Passage.
To insulate itself from “America First” trade policies, Canada is utilizing the Arctic to bypass the US market entirely. The federal government has committed $175 million to the Port of Churchill Plus expansion plan in Manitoba. By transforming this Arctic gateway into a year-round shipping hub, Canada has established direct partnerships with major European ports like Rotterdam and Antwerp-Bruges. This infrastructure allows Western Canada to export critical minerals and energy products straight to Europe, reducing its structural dependence on U.S. trade corridors.
The trade war has spilled over into localized Arctic and sub-Arctic cross-border disruptions. Local leaders have used regional geography to push back against Washington’s tariffs. British Columbia and the Yukon territory have threatened to impose heavy infrastructure tolls on US commercial traffic. Over 27% of commodities moving to and from Alaska are transported via Canadian highways, meaning Canadian border tolls could trap Alaska in an expensive logistical bottleneck. Territorial governments in the Canadian Arctic have stands aligned with Ottawa. For instance, Nunavut proactively stripped U.S.-made liquor from its territorial stores as a symbolic countermeasure.
Despite the severe strain the tariff war has placed on bilateral relations, the threat of foreign adversaries forces a degree of reluctant cooperation in the region. In late 2026, the US and Canada conducted a joint maritime strike scenario in the Bering Sea to counter aggressive Russian and Chinese research vessel deployments near Alaska. Opinions among users are mixed regarding Canada’s independent defense capabilities, with some pointing out that the Canadian Coast Guard remains largely unarmed despite possessing extensive polar experience. Ultimately, while trade relations are deeply fractured, both nations are forced to maintain the NORAD binational command network to prevent Russia or China from exploiting the rift to gain an Arctic foothold.
Greenland also plays a central role in the escalation of the US-Canada trade dispute and Canada-European alliance. Trump’s aggressive push to acquire or control Greenland is a primary driver behind the broader trade war and the reshaped security landscape of the High Arctic.
Greenland’s involvement links directly to the current tariff war and regional access through several key geopolitical mechanisms. In early 2026, President Trump threatened a 10% tariff (escalating to 25%) against Denmark and seven other NATO allies – including the UK, Germany, and France – that opposed the U.S. purchasing Greenland. Canada’s Mark Carney vehemently opposed these threats, urging collective diplomatic resistance among middle powers to protect Danish and Greenlandic sovereignty. Canada’s alignment with European allies against Washington’s Arctic ambitions severely strained relations, hardening the US resolve to implement the harsh 50% Section 338 tariffs on Canada later in the year.
While Trump eventually dropped the threat of an outright forced acquisition, a major trilateral security agreement was signed in late September 2026 between the U.S., Denmark, and Greenland. The deal expands the U.S. military footprint beyond the Pituffik Space Base (formerly Thule) to new defense areas at Narsarsuaq and Mestersvig. This gives the U.S. unprecedented military access across Greenland’s airspace and territorial waters. By locking down Greenland, the US effectively brackets Canada’s eastern Arctic flank. This aggressive U.S. posturing is exactly what prompted Canada to rapidly increase its own northern defense spending – such as its $4 billion over-the-horizon radar network – to ensure Ottawa is not squeezed out of continental defense conversations.
Greenland holds some of the world’s largest untapped deposits of critical minerals and rare earth elements (like the Kvanefjeld and Tanbreez deposits), which are crucial for electric vehicles, defense tech, and green infrastructure. The September 2026 security agreement explicitly bars non-NATO countries from investing in Greenland’s sensitive sectors and restricts foreign control over resource extraction. Washington is using its secure access to Greenlandic minerals to insulate itself from foreign supply chains. This reduces US reliance on Canadian mining exports, stripping Canada of some economic leverage in the tariff dispute. Simultaneously, Canadian policy experts are pushing for Greenland to be integrated into broader North American frameworks (like CUSMA) to prevent a total U.S. monopoly on the island’s resources.
As polar ice sheets melt, the northern shipping corridors flanking Greenland are becoming highly lucrative. Greenland anchors the GIUK (Greenland-Iceland-UK) gap, a critical naval chokepoint. By securing new bases on the island, the US establishes dominant maritime surveillance over ships entering or exiting the Arctic Ocean. This directly challenges Canada’s aspiration to run the Northwest Passage as an independent, sovereign toll route, as any vessel utilizing Canadian Arctic corridors must now navigate a region heavily monitored and influenced by expanded U.S. naval assets.
The great “hope” of the Arctic in the planet’s twilight years of climate change and species extinction is that there will be such an abundance of energy from this region, and proliferation of accessible routes across the region to distribute the energy to clients around the rest of the globe, a region that will be predominantly controlled by the US, Europe and Russia, that traditional sources of energy, notably those in West Asia, will be deemed less vital and even expendable.
Implications for West Asia
Which may go some way, but not all of the way, to explaining the recklessness of the US-Israeli revving up of the war rhetoric against Iran, possibly – in the view of too many experts to name – leading to a new round of conflict within the next two or few days up to and beyond the US midterm elections. A third US aircraft carrier has been directed towards West Asia. US Centcom commander Brad Cooper has advised Trump that US forces are primed and ready for such an attack as soon as they receive the order. In Israel, it looks as though President Isaac Herzog will feel obliged, within a few days of my writing this, to invite Netanyahu to form a coalition. Whether Netanyahu considers he would need to wait even that long is up for debate. It is not totally impossible that Trump would need him to move before November 3rd so as to give Trump a pretext for cancelling the midterms, though I doubt that will happen. We should not entirely overlook the slim possibility of a lighter touch with respect to Israel on Iran in the event that it is Netanyahu’s main rival, Gadi Eisenkot, who receives the invitation to form a coalition. This would involve an alliance with, or support from, an Arab party, something which Eisenkot has previously said he will not entertain. Eisenkot appears to be less existentially obsessed by Iran. But both scenarios involve continuing Israeli dependence on and subservice to, the US.
Whether it is Netanyahu (and it seems to me that Herzog has to go first to the party that won the most seats, even if it did not win a majority, and even though Likud lost many seats overall in the election) or Eisenkot, it goes without saying and – for the moment, in parenthesis – that the election does absolutely nothing to improve the plight of the Palestinians in either Gaza or the West Bank, whose defenselessness is an appalling condemnation of, and ultimately the decapitating blow to, “Western” civilization. As for the supposed home of that civilization – dumbly referenced by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio in his recent speech in praise of US unipolarity in front of the Acropolis in Athens two weeks ago – Israel (the US tool for regional destabilization and imperial glory) is aligning itself with Greece in preparation for an ultimate confrontation between Zionism and Ottoman civilization.
The Israeli-Greek Affair
Israel aligns itself with Greece primarily through a strategic, military, and energy-based partnership in the Eastern Mediterranean, driven by shared friction and competitive relations with Turkey (officially, Turkiye). This is a reminder that the Eastern Mediterranean, largely under Atlanticist influence, may yet prove to rival energy sources a little further east. Greece has signed a multi-billion-dollar deal to acquire Israel’s multi-layered air defense architecture – including Rafael’s David’s Sling, Barak MX, and SPYDER systems – along with an AI-integrated national command network. Greece has leased Israeli Heron drones, signed major military pilot training contracts, and procured Spike missiles from Israeli defense firms like Elbit Systems. The two militaries regularly hold combined naval operations, special forces training, and large-scale exercises utilizing shared airspace and maritime zones.
With respect to Cyprus, Israel, Greece, and the Greek Cypriot Administration formed an institutionalized trilateral framework (dating back to 2016 and reinforced with recent action plans) focused on regional security, intelligence sharing, and maritime cybersecurity. This regional architecture acts as a counterweight to Turkey’s maritime boundaries, exclusive economic zone (EEZ) claims, and growing regional defense influence. The nations have pushed forward with plans for a submarine electricity cable linking Israel, Cyprus, and Greece to integrate regional energy grids and bypass Turkish regional leverage. Greece has maintained high-level diplomatic support and security coordination with Israel – cemented by visits from leadership like Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis – even as broader European and regional tensions over Gaza have strained Israel’s ties elsewhere.
Cyprus is also, of course, a significant base for the British military, and a critically-important lynchpin in US and Israeli war crimes on Iran and other regional targets.
The potential of renewed conflict between Turkey and Greece does not bode well for any hope of long term stability in Libya, where Turkey is allied to the UN-recognized Western government of Libya in opposition to the Eastern US and (covertly) Israeli-backed government under Hafter. It complicates the durability of Turkey’s influence over the Salafist movements that underpin the new regime in Syria, and may make Turkey increasingly nervous of protecting its interests in the Black Sea against regular overspills of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict for Turkish-flagged vessels.
Imminent War on Iran and Flows of Crude
The war on Iran will likely have catastrophic impacts for all parties involved, not just on Iran itself, but on the Gulf countries that Iran will attack – possibly extending to their desalination plants, already threatened by oil polluted waters – and on Saudi Arabia which, targeted yet again by Ansar Allah (which struck another devastating blow on Aramco facilities as October drew to a close), and in coordination with Tehran, will potentially close off the supply of both Iranian and Saudi energy and associated products completely, ushering in a period of severe global, economic depression for practically everyone except China and Russia.
The intensity of the destruction of oil and energy production facilities that has already taken place in both the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab al-Mandab Strait areas makes me so very curious as to claims that the flow of crude through Hormuz has reached levels comparable to the pre-war era. This strikes me – no matter how prestigious the sources of such information – as extremely unlikely.
In addition to my curiosity as to where all this oil is supposedly being produced, a further consideration has to do with the ship owners and the crews and the insurers who must drive any such traffic in circumstances in which tankers are being regularly attacked by drone or by mine. Are they mad to accept such risks? And then there is the question of why the US naval patrols supposedly offering “protection” to tankers have no regard for Iran’s threat capability.
We have a possible but only partial explanation in the idea that the traffic going through Hormuz is paying Tehran for the privilege. But I still wonder about the high volumes that are being cited, especially as we know that a great deal of oil has previously been re-routed along workaround and often overland routes which take a lot longer and are therefore more expensive and which have occasioned severe shortages in the availability of tankers, whose leases becomes correspondingly more expensive.
Even if the volumes through Hormuz have been normalized, still to be taken into account are the grave shortages in the volumes of crude exiting Saudi Arabia and through the Red Sea and Suez Canal – given the Ansar Allah attacks on Aramco’s drilling, refining, piping and other distribution systems. Higher volumes, if they exist, are certainly not bringing down the price of Brent crude which, as I write on November 1st, is close to $118 a barrel. Higher volumes of crude are doing little or nothing to solve the problem of shortages of diesel, essential for industry and transportation almost everywhere, and of aviation fuel, given the severe reduction in refining capacity. I cannot avoid re-mention of Russia and Europe’s suicidal if ineffective attempts to keep Russian energy stuck in Russia since that too is part of the grizzly equation here.
I note that Trump is proposing to pressure Indian refineries to take in more of Venezuela’s heavy crude, but activation of the necessary investment to bring about significant increases in Venezuelan crude is a process that will not be accomplished overnight, especially in a context in which Trump’s so-far smooth run with the Chavistas is increasingly likely to meet disruption between a citizenry still denied elections, a Constitution that will need rewriting if Trump’s assault on the nation’s crude and other maneuvers are to be “legitimated,” and the return to the fray of divisive María Corina Machado, leader of the rightwing Liberal party.
But for now, Europe thinks it has Canada. Does the US realize that it might not have Canada? Is Greenland just as good?
Sure, there are partial alternatives (not to forget Venezuela, just mentioned, Brazil, Guyana etc.) and I have addressed these at earlier stages of the current crisis, but the idea that these can be activated to anything remotely close to sufficient volumes in a relatively short period of time seems to me too improbable to be credible.
We are due for a period of frightening chaos but, rest assured, Big Money isn’t worried because Big Money thinks it is Big Enough to navigate the storms ahead, no matter how many millions or even billions must suffer in the process.
Hold on to your caps and hats.
(Featured Image: “Mark Carney calls for an ‘alliance for the future’ between the EU and Canada” by European Parliament licensed under CC 4.0.)
